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I. INTRODUCTION 
There’s no place like home—but what happens when an individual 
is removed from the only home they have ever known?  Familial child 
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snatching is a widespread problem wreaking havoc on the law.1  The 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 
(“Hague Convention”)3 provides for the immediate return of children who 
are unlawfully removed from their country of habitual residence.4  The 
signatory countries drafted the Hague Convention as a response to the 
problem of estranged parents wrongfully taking children across 
international borders from one signatory nation to another, and provides 
for the child’s prompt return to the appropriate forum. 5  Under Article 12, 
when a child who is a habitual resident of one signatory state is unlawfully 
removed to another signatory state, the latter must order the return of the 
child.6 
Nevertheless, while aiming to provide a standard for quickly and 
efficiently returning the child to his or her country of habitual residence, 
the Hague Convention has proven to be an impediment, rather than a 
solution, to the problem.  As a result, there is a deep-rooted circuit split, 
since the federal circuit courts have been left to formulate their own 
standards.  The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a standard 
that focuses on the objective signs of a child’s acclimatization, while the 
Second and Ninth Circuits have focused on the parents’ last shared 
subjective intentions to determine the child’s habitual residence.7 
                                                                                                                         
 1 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION - 
STATISTICS, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/legal
/compliance/statistics.html (providing statistics that reflect the number of international 
parental abduction cases reported to the United States Central Authority in 2012). 
 2 See Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction - Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions
.statusprint&cid=24 (providing a list of the contracting states to the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction). 
 3 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 4 While the Hague Convention does not define “habitual residence,” courts have been 
instructed to interpret the phrase according to “the ordinary and natural meaning of the two 
words it contains [, as] a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances 
of any particular case.” C v S, 2 All E.R. 961, 965 (Eng.H.L. 1990). 
 5 See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2013)(finding that a 
signatory state is a state that contracts to “commit to have in place judicial and 
administrative remedies for the return of children taken from the State of their habitual 
residence to another signatory State in violation of the left-behind parent’s custody rights 
under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence.”) 
 6 See Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Explanatory 
Report by Elisa Perez-Vera [Perez-Vera Report], ¶¶ 11, 13, & 16 (Vol. III), (1980), 
available at http://www.haguejudicialresources.org/Hague_Judicial_Resources/Perez-
VeraReport.html. 
 7 Compare Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010), Feder v. Evans-
Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995), and Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 
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In its recent decision in Redmond v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit 
illustrated how sharply divided the circuits are regarding the proper 
standard to determine habitual residence.8  Redmond involved a father who 
filed a Hague Convention petition9 claiming that the mother wrongfully 
retained their child in the United States.10  Although the parents had 
initially agreed to raise their son in Ireland, the Seventh Circuit held that, 
for purposes of the Hague Convention, his habitual residence was 
Illinois.11  The court explained that the child was born in Illinois, and with 
the exception of seven months during his infancy, he lived there, 
maintained frequent contact with family members there, received 
recurrent care from Illinois doctors, attended school, and established many 
friendships in the area.12  In doing so, the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
district court’s holding that Ireland was the child’s habitual residence,13 
finding the district court’s decision problematic because it considered the 
parents’ “last shared intent” about where the child would live as a 
dispositive factor.14  According to the Seventh Circuit, the district court 
failed to consider the child’s perspective and disregarded what a child in 
his position would have viewed as his habitual residence.15 
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged a split between the 
circuits that follow a standard that focuses on the parents’ perspectives, 
and “those that use a more child-centric approach.”16  The court asserted, 
“in substance, all circuits—ours included—consider both parental intent 
and the child’s acclimatization, differing only in their emphasis.”17  The 
decision in Redmond appropriately illustrates the current problem, because 
it demonstrates that the essence of the disagreement between the circuits 
                                                                                                                         
(6th Cir. 1993), with Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2005), and Mozes v. 
Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 8 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 9 In order to file a Hague Convention petition, the first step is to contact the country 
officer assigned to the child’s case and determine what options are available. It is important 
to submit a Hague petition as soon as practicable following an abduction or wrongful 
retention. A custody order is not necessary in order to file a petition. The Hague petition 
form should be filled out and submitted with the requisite supporting documentation. 
Before submitting the petition, it is recommended that individuals consult with an attorney. 
Once submitted, the petitioner should stay in close contact with the appropriate country 
officer. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION – FILING A 
HAGUE APPLICATION, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/eng
lish/from/hague-app.html. 
 10 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 731. 
 11 Id. at 732. 
 12 Id. at 743. 
 13 Id. at 732. 
 14 Id. at 744. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 745. 
 17 Id. at 746. 
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is how much weight to give parental intent as opposed to the child’s 
perspective.18 
The Hague Convention provides a legal process for countries to work 
together on international parental child abduction cases.19  In order for the 
Hague Convention to apply, the child must have been habitually resident 
in one signatory country, and wrongfully removed to, or retained in, 
another signatory country.20  Courts in the child’s habitual residence are in 
the best position to make custody determinations, and therefore, it is a 
priority to ensure that they return there.  Thus, the establishment of 
habitual residence is a critical threshold determination in Hague 
Convention proceedings.  This Comment argues that courts should adopt 
a hybrid subjective and objective reasonable person standard that focuses 
on the child’s perspective and past experience.  Such a standard would 
most effectively adhere to both the spirit and letter of the Hague 
Convention’s stated purpose.  Part II of this Comment examines the 
history of the Hague Convention and highlights its central purpose.  Part 
III discusses when the Hague Convention applies, and introduces the 
vagueness of the habitual residence determination.  Part IV analyzes the 
variant approaches of the circuit courts, including both the child-centric 
and parental intent models, and examines the case law leading up to 
Redmond.  Finally, Part V argues that a unified standard for determining 
habitual residence is imperative to fulfill the fundamental goals of the 
Hague Convention. 
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
Adopted in 1980, the Hague Convention intended to prevent parents 
from fleeing internationally with their children in the hopes of receiving a 
favorable custody determination in a more amenable jurisdiction.21  One 
might assume that by including terms like “abduction” and “force,” the 
drafters composed the treaty as a response to concern regarding forceful 
kidnappings by strangers.22  On the contrary, the drafters composed the 
treaty as a response to the unilateral and wrongful removal or retention of 
children by a parent, guardian, or other family member.23 
                                                                                                                         
 18 Id. 
 19 See generally, Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-
Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 20 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11. 
 21 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11. 
 22 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 23 Id. at 1069–70. 
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Signatory states to the Hague Convention commit to protect children 
from the deleterious effects of a child’s wrongful removal or retention, 
which occur after those children are displaced from the family and social 
environment in which they have developed.24  Still, the Hague Convention 
is more than that.  A primary objective of the Hague Convention is to 
maintain the existing state of affairs and to allow the country with the 
greatest connection to a child to make decisions about that child’s 
custodial arrangement and future.25  When a court determines that a 
particular country is the child’s habitual residence, that court should order 
the child’s immediate return, unless certain exceptions apply.26  
Nevertheless, this return is not necessarily required: (1) if the individual 
claiming wrongful removal was not actually exercising their custody 
rights at the time of removal or retention or consented to the removal or 
retention; (2) if the child objects to being returned and has reached an age 
of maturity; or (3) if returning the child to the country of habitual residence 
would pose a serious threat of physical or psychological harm to the child 
or violate human rights.27  Thus, the determination of habitual residence 
has a profound and enduring impact on the child. 
III.       APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION: THE AMBIGUITY OF THE 
HABITUAL RESIDENCE FACTOR 
In order for the return remedy to apply under the Hague Convention, 
a child’s removal or retention must be found to be wrongful under the 
treaty.28  A showing of wrongful removal or retention hinges upon 
demonstrating two requirements.29  Article 3 states, in pertinent part: 
[T]he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered 
wrongful where 
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an 
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law 
of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the removal or retention; and 
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually 
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised 
but for the removal or retention.30 
                                                                                                                         
 24 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11. 
 25 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). 
 26 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13. 
 27 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13. 
 28 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13. 
 29 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3. 
 30 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3. 
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Moreover, Article 4 provides that the Hague Convention applies to a 
child who habitually resided in a signatory state immediately before any 
breach of custody or access rights, as long as the child is under the age of 
sixteen.31 
Once it is clear that the Hague Convention is applicable in a 
particular situation, courts generally employ a four-part test to resolve the 
issues stemming from Article 3.32  First, a court must ask when the removal 
or retention at issue took place.33  Next, it should analyze the 
circumstances directly prior to the removal or retention to discern which 
country was the child’s habitual residence.34  After further examination to 
see whether “the removal or retention breach[ed] the rights of custody35 
attributed to the petitioner under the law of habitual residence,” a court 
must finally decide whether the petitioner was “exercising those rights at 
the time of the removal or retention.”36 
The crux of the problem lies in the second question of the Hague 
Convention analysis – determining the state of “habitual residence” – as 
the Hague Convention itself neither defines nor elaborates on the term.37  
Furthermore, minimal case law exists regarding the interpretation of the 
Hague Convention, and the cases that do address the term, fail to provide 
concrete guidance on the meaning of “habitual residence.”38 
IV.  THE VARIANT APPROACHES OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
As recognized in Redmond, the circuits are currently split regarding 
the appropriate standard to be used.39  This split has its roots in the 
disagreement over what factors the courts should consider in determining 
                                                                                                                         
 31 Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 4. 
 32 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 An example of breaching custody rights would be if one parent sought sole custody 
over a child outside the habitual residence and thus disregarded the rights of the other 
parent, protected by law, and interfered with their   normal exercise. See Perez-Vera, supra 
note 6, at ¶ 11. 
 36 Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1070. 
 37 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 42 (2010)(exploring other countries’ interpretation 
of the Hague Convention, but noting that while Congress has instructed that a uniform 
interpretation is inherent in the Convention’s framework, the Court  “should not substitute 
the judgment of other courts for our own.”); see also id. (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371, 375 (1998))(stating that “while we should give respectful consideration to the 
interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction 
to interpret such, it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express 
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the 
implementation of the treaty in that State.”). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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a child’s habitual residence, and the weight to give to the parents’ and 
child’s perspectives.  Because “[t]he Hague Convention is generally 
intended to restore the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from 
crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court,” the determination 
of habitual resident is essential. 40   Generally, the Third, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits have shaped a standard that stresses the importance of focusing 
on the child’s perspective, while the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared intentions. 
A. The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits: The Child’s Perspective 
The majority of the circuits tasked with interpreting the proper test 
for habitual residence under the Hague Convention have explicitly 
recognized the primacy of the child’s point of view.41 When determining 
which country is the child’s habitual residence, these circuits approach the 
inquiry by focusing on the child’s perspectives and past experience, and 
place significantly less weight on, and occasionally disregard, the parents’ 
intentions and future plans.42  These cases highlight the notion that 
focusing on the parents’ shared intent at the time the child was born sheds 
little light on the question of the child’s habitual residence at the time of 
the alleged wrongful removal, which often occurs years later.43 
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to determine 
whether a parent’s unilateral removal of a child from one country to 
another was “wrongful.”44  In its 1993 decision Friedrich v. Friedrich, the 
court engaged in one of the earliest applications of the Hague Convention 
in the United States.45  The Sixth Circuit heard the case of Mr. Friedrich, 
who appealed the denial of his petition for the return of his son, Thomas, 
to Germany.46  Thomas was twenty-one months old at the time of the 
petition, which alleged that Thomas’s mother had removed him from 
Germany to the United States days after the couple separated, without Mr. 
Friedrich’s knowledge or consent.47 
                                                                                                                         
 40 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 41 See, e.g., Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-
Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
 42 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401. 
 43 See, e.g., Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-
Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
 44 Id. at 1398. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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Acknowledging that the Hague Convention fails to define “habitual 
residence,”48 the Sixth Circuit further noted that no United States cases 
supplied guidance on the interpretation of habitual residence, and that 
minimal case law existed on the Hague Convention at all.49  The court 
posited that habitual residence should not be mistaken for domicile,50 and 
formulated its own standard to determine the habitual residence, stating, 
“the court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past 
experience, not future intentions.”51  The court explained that a child can 
have only one habitual residence, and it was imperative for courts to look 
back in time, rather than forward.52 
Because it is natural that a family may choose to relocate over the 
course of a child’s life, the Sixth Circuit elaborated on what should be 
considered when deciding whether a child’s habitual residence has 
changed.53  The court asserted that habitual residence could only be 
modified by a change in geography and the passage of time, and not by 
changes in parental care and responsibility.54  The court stressed that the 
requisite change in geography had to occur before the alleged unlawful 
removal in order to be given any effect.55  To hold otherwise, or to focus 
the inquiry solely on the parental perspective, would enable parents to 
abduct their children and later characterize their wrongful removals as 
changes in habitual residence.56  Such a standard would render the Hague 
Convention virtually meaningless.57  As other circuits have noted, this idea 
highlights the court’s tendency to emphasize the importance of the child’s 
point of view and downplay parental intent.58 
When applying its new standard to the facts of the case, the Sixth 
Circuit found that Mrs. Friedrich’s focus on her future plans disregarded 
Thomas’s point of view.59  Mrs. Friedrich argued that, although Thomas’s 
ordinary residence was always in Germany, Thomas was a habitual 
resident of the United States because he possessed United States 
citizenship—his United States documentation listed his address as Ohio—
                                                                                                                         
 48 Id. at 1400. 
 49 Id. at 1400–01. 
 50 See Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401 (noting that while common law domicile is more of 
a technical term of art, habitual residence is a factual determination that looks to the 
individual facts and circumstances of each situation without relying on pre-suppositions). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1401–02. 
 54 Id. at 1402. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1402. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 744. 
 59 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401. 
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and because she eventually intended to return, with Thomas, to the United 
States.60  The court reasoned that it was erroneous to rely on factors that 
solely reflected the intention of Mrs. Friedrich, when it is the perspective 
of the child that is significant.61  The court stated that even though Mrs. 
Friedrich established a connection between Thomas and the United States, 
and may have intended for Thomas to move there at some point in the 
future, Thomas was born in and resided solely in Germany for his entire 
life.62  Therefore, any future plans to reside in the United States were 
immaterial to the habitual residence inquiry.63  Deeming it a “simple case,” 
the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that Germany was Thomas’s habitual 
residence at the time of his removal.64  Consequently, the court ordered 
Thomas’s return to Germany for the resolution of the custody dispute 
under German law.65 
In 1995, the Third Circuit faced the same issue of determining a 
standard for interpreting habitual residence in Feder v. Evans-Feder.66  
Feder involved two American citizens who met in Germany in 1987 and 
whose son, Evan, was born in Germany in 1990.67  The family moved 
several times; first to Pennsylvania in 1990, then to Australia in January 
1994.68  Shortly thereafter, the couple’s relationship deteriorated.69  Mrs. 
Feder decided that she wanted to leave Mr. Feder and return to the United 
States with Evan, telling Mr. Feder that she wished to take Evan to visit 
her parents in Pennsylvania.70  On June 29, 1994, Mrs. Feder took Evan to 
the United States, but neither she, nor Evan, ever returned to Australia.71  
In his petition, Mr. Feder alleged that Mrs. Feder had wrongfully retained 
their son in the United States, and demanded Evan’s return to Australia.72  
The district court concluded that the United States was Evan’s habitual 
residence.73 
                                                                                                                         
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1402. 
 65 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3 (explaining that whether a parent was 
exercising lawful custody rights over a child at the time of removal must be determined 
under the law of the child’s habitual residence). 
 66 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 67 Id. at 218. 
 68 Id. at 219. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 219–20. 
 71 Id. at 220. 
 72 Feder, 63 F.3d at 220. 
 73 Id. at 224. 
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On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a child’s habitual 
residence is where he or she has been physically present for a period of 
time sufficient for acclimatization and perceives a “degree of settled 
purpose.”74  The court further reasoned that, when determining what 
satisfies this standard, a court must engage in an analysis focusing on the 
child and analyzing the child’s circumstances, coupled with the parents’ 
present, shared intentions.75  Applying this standard to the facts of the case, 
the Third Circuit concluded that Australia was Evan’s habitual residence 
immediately prior to his removal to the United States by his mother.76  
Evan remained in Australia for close to six months prior to the removal, 
and the court viewed this as a meaningful amount of time for a four-year-
old child.77  The court also found the fact that Evan had attended pre-
school in Australia and enrolled in kindergarten for the coming year 
persuasive.78 
The court noted that although Mr. and Mrs. Feder differed on their 
opinions regarding living in Australia, they still clearly set out to make a 
new home for themselves and their family there.79  They bought a new 
house, pursued employment, and organized Evan’s long-term schooling.80  
The court asserted that the fact that “Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain 
in Australia permanently and believed that she would leave if her marriage 
did not improve does not void the couple’s settled purpose to live as a 
family in the place where Mr. Feder had found work.”81  This conclusion 
highlights the Third Circuit’s emphasis on the principles announced in 
Friedrich, downplaying parental intent and looking to the past rather than 
the future when attempting to ascertain habitual residence.82  The court 
deemed the fact that Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in Australia 
irrelevant.83  The fact that Evan lived in Australia for the period leading 
up to his “removal” was more important than where Mrs. Feder intended 
Evan to live in the future.84 
Although the Feder court’s analysis considered the parents’ actions, 
the crux of the inquiry still focused on the child’s perspective.  
Furthermore, while it gave more attention to the parents’ settled purpose 
                                                                                                                         
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Feder, 63 F.3d at 224. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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than the Sixth Circuit did in Friedrich, the Third Circuit also gave 
significantly more weight to Evan’s perspective, concluding that he was 
physically present for a sufficient amount of time to become acclimatized 
with his situation in Australia, achieving an adequate “degree of settled 
purpose” from his perspective.85 Thus, the Third Circuit found that the 
district court placed unnecessary emphasis on the fact that Evan had spent 
the majority of his life in the United States, ignoring the circumstances of 
his life in Australia leading up to the alleged wrongful removal.86 
While Feder seems to conflict with the holding of Friedrich, in 
which the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact that the child spent his entire 
life in Germany, the cases are factually distinguishable.  Even though a 
child can only have one habitual residence at a particular point in time, 
habitual residence can change over time depending on a family’s 
individual circumstances.87  Habitual residence can be altered by change 
in geography, and when a child relocates, they re-start the 
“acclimatization” process.88 Thus, what matters is not necessarily where 
the child spent the majority of his or her life, but rather, the last place in 
which the child spent enough time and would consider herself, from her 
perspective, settled in that place.89 While the Third and Sixth Circuits do 
not share an identical standard for determining habitual residence, they do 
share a commitment to placing significantly more weight on the child’s 
perspectives and past residency, rather than the parents’ intentions and the 
future.90 
In 2010, the Eighth Circuit similarly struggled when determining the 
standard to apply when deciding a child’s habitual residence in Barzilay v. 
Barzilay.91  Mr. Barzilay appealed from the district court’s dismissal of his 
petition claiming that his former wife unlawfully retained their three 
children in Missouri, and sought an order compelling their relocation to 
Israel.92  Mr. and Mrs. Barzilay were Israeli citizens who married in Israel 
in 1994 and had three children.93  The oldest child, an Israeli citizen, was 
born in Israel, while the other two children, holding dual American and 
Israeli citizenship, were born in Missouri.94  In 2001, Mr. and Mrs. 
                                                                                                                         
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Feder, 63 F.3d at 224. 
 90 See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 91 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 92 Id. at 914. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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Barzilay obtained American work visas and moved from the Netherlands, 
where they had lived for approximately two years, to Missouri.95  The 
children resided in Missouri from 2001 until the commencement of 
relevant court proceedings in 2006.96  The oldest child had not lived in 
Israel since her early youth, while the other two children never lived 
there.97  Based on these facts, the district court found that the children’s 
country of habitual residence was the United States, because they had lived 
in Missouri for about five years prior to the commencement of the 
wrongful retention action.98 
The Eighth Circuit articulated that the first step in Hague Convention 
cases is to determine when the alleged wrongful removal or retention took 
place.99  According to the Eighth Circuit, when determining habitual 
residence, the significant time to analyze is immediately before the 
removal or retention.100  The court highlighted several factors that are 
relevant to the inquiry, including “the settled purpose of the move to the 
new country from the child’s perspective, parental intent regarding the 
move, the change in geography, the passage of time, and the 
acclimatization of the child to the new country.”101  The court elaborated 
on these elements, noting that settled purpose does not mean that the 
individuals will stay in a new location forever, but that the family must 
have a “sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as 
settled.”102  Moreover, settled purpose should be discerned from the child’s 
perspective, although parental intent should also be considered.103 
The court reiterated the analysis of the district court and agreed with 
its conclusion that the children’s place of habitual residence was the 
United States.104  The district court had found that two of the children lived 
in Missouri for their entire lives, and the oldest child had lived there for 
five years.105 The court found nothing in the record to suggest that the 
children had spent any considerable amount of time in another country, 
and from the children’s perspective, the “settled purpose of the family’s 
residence in Missouri was to remain there permanently.”106  While noting 
that parental intent was ambiguous in this case, the district court decided 
                                                                                                                         
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 914–15. 
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that Mr. and Mrs. Barzilay had abandoned their previous habitual 
residence when they moved to Missouri and planned to remain there 
indefinitely.107 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that 
the children were sufficiently acclimatized to life in the United States.108  
The Eighth Circuit explained that the oldest child was the only one who 
experienced a substantial change in geography, and by 2006 she had spent 
approximately five years—half of her life—in the United States.109  
Furthermore, the two younger children had always lived in Missouri.110  
The court also gave considerable weight to the fact that the children 
attended school in United States, and had never attended school in 
Israel.111  The Eighth Circuit agreed that, under the Hague Convention, the 
children’s country of habitual residence was the United States.112  The 
court found no evidence demonstrating that the children spent any 
meaningful amount of time outside of the United States since 2001, or that 
the children had reason to believe that their home was a place other than 
Missouri.113  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit focused on the children’s 
perspective, giving considerable weight to which country the children 
would view as their home.114 
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits: The Parents’ Shared Intent 
Although the majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue 
have found that focusing on the child’s perspective in habitual residence 
determinations most effectively fulfills the purpose of the Hague 
Convention, some courts have stressed the importance of focusing on the 
parents’ perspective.115  These circuits apply a standard that solely 
examines the shared intentions of the parents when determining which 
country is the child’s habitual residence.  These cases highlight the notion 
that focusing on the parents’ shared intent is inevitable because children 
lack the wherewithal to decide where they want to reside.116 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes v. Mozes is the leading case 
that focuses on the parents’ perspective in determining a child’s habitual 
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residence.117  Mr. and Mrs. Mozes were Israeli citizens who were married 
in 1982 and had four children between the ages of seven and sixteen at the 
time of the disputed removal.118  The family lived in Israel until 1997, 
when Mrs. Mozes and the children moved to Los Angeles, California, with 
Mr. Mozes’s consent.119  The parents agreed that the children would 
benefit from attending school in the United States, so Mrs. Mozes moved 
with the children to Beverly Hills, where she leased a home, bought 
automobiles and registered the children for school.120  While Mr. and Mrs. 
Mozes agreed that Mrs. Mozes and the children would remain in the 
United States for fifteen months, they disagreed as to what arrangement 
existed beyond that.121 
A year after they settled in the United States, Mrs. Mozes sought 
dissolution of the marriage and custody of the children.122  Mr. Mozes then 
filed a petition seeking to have the children returned to Israel. In his 
petition, Mr. Mozes claimed that Mrs. Mozes wrongfully retained the 
children in the United States when she sought dissolution of the marriage 
and custody of the children.123  While the oldest child elected to return to 
Israel voluntarily, Mr. Mozes appealed the district court’s denial of his 
petition with regard to the three other children.124 
The court addressed the question of whose settled intention dictates 
whether a child has deserted a prior habitual residence, and asserted that 
while the intuitive answer would be the child, this approach is flawed.125  
The court reasoned that there is an “obvious problem” with focusing on 
the child’s perspective and disregarding parental intent, as children often 
lack the wherewithal to determine where they will reside.126  The court 
thus concluded that “the intention or purpose which has to be taken into 
account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of the 
child’s residence.”127  According to the court, when parents jointly plan to 
raise a child in a place and live there, that place becomes the child’s 
habitual residence.128  While the court determined that a child’s country of 
habitual residence could ultimately change if the parents mutually decide 
to abandon one habitual residence in favor of another, it maintained that 
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the unilateral intention of only one parent is insufficient to establish a new 
habitual residence for a child.129 
The Ninth Circuit explained that even though children can be 
exceptionally adaptable and form strong attachments in short periods of 
time, they do not necessarily expect or intend those relationships to last.130  
The court further reasoned that children might participate in activities of 
daily life and still retain awareness that they have another life to which 
they will return.131  The Ninth Circuit asserted that the appropriate inquiry 
was not solely whether the children had become settled in the United 
States, but whether the United States had replaced Israel as the center of 
the children’s familial and social development.”132  Because the district 
court failed to answer this question, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case.133 
It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a 
difficulty arises “when the persons entitled to fix the child’s residence no 
longer agree on where it has been fixed.”134  The court, which focused on 
the parents’ intent, implicitly recognized a significant flaw in its own 
analysis.135  The court attempted to address this issue by dividing these 
situations into three categories.136  The first includes cases where the 
family demonstrated a settled purpose to alter habitual residence, even 
though one parent had reservations about the move.137  The court stated 
that, in these situations, one parent’s qualms about moving would not 
prevent a finding of a shared and settled purpose.138  The second category 
includes cases where the child’s move from an established habitual 
residence was intended to be only for a limited period.139  The court noted 
that, in these situations, the changed intentions of one parent do not lead 
to an alteration of the child’s habitual residence.140  The third category 
consists of cases where the petitioning parent had previously agreed to let 
the child remain abroad for an uncertain duration.141  The court stated that 
sometimes it will infer a mutual abandonment of the child’s previous 
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habitual residence, and other times the court will not be able to recognize 
a settled mutual intent from which to presume abandonment.142 
Gitter v. Gitter, out of the Second Circuit, also formulated a habitual 
residence standard emphasizing a focus on the parents’ intentions. 143  
Gitter involved two individuals who were born in Israel, later met in New 
York, married, and had a son, Eden.144  After Eden’s birth, Mr. Gitter 
wanted to move to Israel, and although Mrs. Gitter was hesitant, he 
ultimately convinced her.145  About a year after the family had moved, 
Mrs. Gitter took their son on a trip to New York and never returned to 
Israel.146  Mr. Gitter filed a petition seeking Eden’s return to Israel under 
the Hague Convention.147 
In reviewing Mr. Gitter’s petition, the Second Circuit was greatly 
influenced by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes.148  The court 
reiterated the “importance of intentions (normally the shared intentions of 
the parents or others entitled to fix the child’s residence) in determining a 
child’s habitual residence.”149  The court elaborated on the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, stating that merely observing the child’s behavior was a 
defective approach because it may produce remarkably different results 
depending on the time frame.150  For these reasons, the Second Circuit 
concluded that it would specifically focus on the intent of those entitled to 
decide the place of the child’s residence, which are likely to be the 
parents.151 
When examining the pertinent facts, the Second Circuit looked at 
whether Mr. and Mrs. Gitter shared the intent that Israel would remain 
Eden’s habitual residence.152  The court agreed with the district court in 
finding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter only agreed to move to Israel on a 
conditional basis.153  Concluding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter did not intend 
for Israel to be Eden’s habitual residence, and taking into account the fact 
that the district court was unaware of the proper legal standard, the court 
remanded the case so that the district court could view the facts in light of 
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the opinion.154 The Second Circuit acknowledged that because the Hague 
Convention is focused on the habitual residence of the child, it would 
appear logical to focus on the child’s intentions.155 Nevertheless, weary of 
the fact that young children often lack the capacity to decide where they 
will reside, the court followed Mozes and agreed “it is more useful to focus 
on the intent of the child’s parents or others who may fix the child’s 
residence.”156 
Redmond v. Redmond, one of the most recent cases addressing the 
standard for determining habitual residence, recognized the magnitude of 
the circuit split regarding the standard that should be used in determining 
habitual residence.157  The court did not follow any of the other circuits’ 
approaches, noting that it was imprudent to set the relative weights of 
parental intent and the child’s perspective in stone.158  The court posited 
that, “the habitual residence inquiry remains essentially fact-bound, 
practical, and unencumbered with rigid rules, formulas, or 
presumptions.”159  The Seventh Circuit failed to set forth a structured 
standard, and did not resolve how to balance the parents’ and child’s 
perspectives, inadvertently deepening the divide amongst the circuits. 
V. ELIMINATING THE DIVIDE: A HYBRID SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD FOCUSING ON THE CHILD’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
This part argues that it is necessary for courts to follow a uniform 
approach when deciding a child’s habitual residence, focusing on the 
perspective of the child rather than the parents, and examining past 
experiences rather than future intentions.  This Comment proposes a 
hybrid subjective and objective standard concentrating on which country 
a reasonable person in the child’s particular situation would view as his or 
her country of habitual residence.  The federal circuit courts remain 
divided regarding the appropriate standard for determining habitual 
residence.  While the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a 
standard that focuses on the child’s perspective, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last 
shared intentions. 
It is vitally important for the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the 
existing split and provide a uniform standard.  Clarity and uniformity is 
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particularly essential when dealing with jurisdictional and international 
disputes.160  The Hague Convention is designed to address international 
adjudications by foreign nations that inherently possess materially 
dissimilar legal, cultural, and social systems.  The grave differences in the 
circuit courts’ reasoning demonstrate that a fixed standard is necessary to 
properly regulate enforcement.  Lack of consistency also complicates the 
enforcement process by decreasing the certainty of the outcome and 
becoming an unnecessarily lengthy process, which can be detrimental to 
the child involved.161 
Courts are inconsistently enforcing individuals’ rights due to the 
variation of habitual residence standards.  While the Ninth Circuit holds 
that courts should focus on the parents’ shared intent because children lack 
the wherewithal to decide where they want to reside, this approach is 
flawed. 162  Parents often disagree as to their last shared intent in Hague 
Convention cases, leaving the courts with an ill-suited standard.  Similarly, 
although the Third Circuit holds that “a child’s habitual residence is the 
place where he or she has been physically present for an amount of time 
sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’ 
from the child’s perspective,” case law has failed to determine what 
exactly is an appropriate amount of time sufficient for acclimatization.163  
The Eighth Circuit characterizes its habitual residence test as the location 
where a family possesses “a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 
described as settled,” but there is a shortage of guidance regarding what 
constitutes a “sufficient degree.” 164  These inconsistencies further 
strengthen the necessity for a uniform international interpretation. 
The goal of the Hague Convention is to maintain the status quo as 
well as protect the best interests of the child.165  What a parent may have 
“hoped” for a child is irrelevant to what the child actually experienced.  
Because the Hague Convention is concerned with a child’s habitual 
residence, the child’s perspective of habitual residence should be the only 
perspective considered.  This standard most closely relates to the 
principles set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich, which found that “to 
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determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the child, not the 
parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”166  Ordering 
a return remedy under the Hague Convention enables the courts of the 
home country to determine what is in the child’s best interests, and should 
focus on the child’s experience and perspective. 
An appropriate approach would be a hybrid subjective and objective 
standard, focusing on which country a reasonable person in the situation 
would view as their country of habitual residence.  This subjective 
component will enable a court to consider the child’s age, capacity, and 
maturity, and the objective component will allow a court to consider a 
child’s perspective, from a reasonable person in that situation.167  A child 
who spends his or her entire life in country A, and never lived in country 
B, would likely view country A as his or her habitual residence.  Thus, 
even if the child’s parents intended for country B to be the habitual 
residence, it would undeniably serve the best interests of the child to 
remain in country A.168 This standard is reconcilable with Friedrich, as it 
emphasizes both the child’s perspective and past experiences.  
Furthermore, it is imperative that courts focus on what the child actually 
experienced, rather than what the parents intended for the child to 
experience, because the Hague Convention aims to protect the best 
interests of the child.169 
The Second and Ninth Circuits misconstrue the standard set out by 
those courts that emphasize the child-centric approach. 170  The courts that 
focus on the child’s perspective do not suggest that in order to determine 
habitual residence courts must look at where the child perceived he or she 
would reside in the future.  Rather, these courts analyze, from the child’s 
point of view, the place in which they spent considerable time before the 
alleged wrongful removal and would consider themselves settled.171  The 
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Second and Ninth Circuits, however, mistakenly focus on future intentions 
rather than past reality. 
When a couple first has a child, they can choose to raise that child in 
any place they desire.  But, when determining habitual residence, this 
intent is irrelevant if the child establishes a settled lifestyle in a completely 
different place.  The Second and Ninth Circuit’s focus on the parents’ last 
shared intent leads to inconsistent outcomes and does not enable courts to 
make decisions in the best interests of the child.172  While the Ninth Circuit 
alleges that children lack the wherewithal to decide where they will reside, 
this claim is misguided. 173  The habitual residence inquiry should be more 
concerned with where a child has been in the past, and where they were 
settled leading up the alleged wrongful removal.  The way in which the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) 
defines “home state” is particularly instructive when determining a child’s 
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.174  The UCCJEA is a 
Uniform Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1997.175  The UCCJEA was drafted to achieve 
uniformity in state laws regarding jurisdiction and custody matters in order 
to avoid disputes between competing jurisdictions.176  The UCCJEA’s 
primary purpose is to vest “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” for child 
custody litigation in the courts of the child’s “home state.”177 
The UCCJEA and the Hague Convention are comparable because 
both “provide for a reasoned determination of where jurisdiction over a 
custody dispute is properly placed,” and do so from the child’s 
perspective.178  The UCCJEA defines “home state” as the state where the 
child has lived with a parent for six continuous months prior to the 
commencement of the proceeding, or since birth for children younger than 
six months.179  If the child has not lived in any state for at least six 
consecutive months, the court will look to see which state has “significant 
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connections” with the child and at least one parent and “substantial 
evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships.”180  Once a court has selected an appropriate “home state,” 
that state may assume child-custody jurisdiction.181  The “home state” 
determination thus focuses on where the child has spent the majority of his 
or her life, rather than any shared intention the parents may have had. 
It is clear that the “home state” determination is an approach from 
the child’s perspective, specifically because the state must have significant 
connections with the child and at least one parent—but not both parents.182  
Additionally, the court applying the UCCJEA is interested in the 
substantial evidence regarding the child’s “care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships” rather than the parental intent for any of these 
factors.183  The UCCJEA’s approach suggests that the child’s perspective, 
regardless of age, trumps parental intent, and that past experiences take 
precedence over future intentions.184 
In Delvoye v. Lee, the Third Circuit addressed the Ninth Circuit’s 
claim that a child-centric approach is problematic because young children 
are not capable of possessing a perspective. 185  The case involved a 
habitual residence determination for a 2-month-old baby.186  The court 
noted that an infant’s habitual residence is not necessarily the habitual 
residence of the parents, and emphasized that a young child “will normally 
have no habitual residence until living in a country on a footing of some 
stability.”187  This reasoning helps demonstrate that, even for the youngest 
children, habitual residence must be viewed from the child’s 
perspective.188  Specifically, courts must look at the circumstances of the 
child to determine the country that served as the focal point of the child’s 
lifestyle and social development, even if that point consisted of a short 
period of time.189  The Third and Eighth Circuits have stated that in no way 
does an infant’s habitual residence automatically become that of its 
mother.190  It would be inconsistent with the Hague Convention to derive 
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a child’s habitual residence from its mother, because it would “create an 
impermissible presumption that the child’s habitual residence is wherever 
the mother happens to be.”191 
The proposed standard focusing on the child is further bolstered by 
several inherent weaknesses of any approach focusing on parental intent.  
In Gitter, the Second Circuit stated that, “[i]n the easy case, the parents (or 
others entitled to determine the child’s residence) will agree on where the 
child’s habitual residence is fixed, and we are likely to conclude that the 
child’s habitual residence is as intended.”192  Yet, at the same time, the 
court recognized that “[i]n nearly all of the cases that arise under the 
Convention, however, the parents have come to disagree as to the place of 
the child’s habitual residence.”193  This explicit acknowledgement of the 
tension inherent in its own approach demonstrates the significant problem 
with focusing on parental intent, because there is most likely a 
disagreement over which country the parents intended as the child’s 
habitual residence.  Another inevitable flaw in following the Second and 
Ninth Circuit’s approach is that an emphasis on shared parental intent does 
not work when the parents are essentially estranged from the outset, which 
is often the circumstance in Hague Convention cases. 194 An obvious 
problem in such disputes is that the parents often possess different 
intentions for the habitual residence of their child. These inconsistent 
solutions to various situations demonstrate that focusing on the parents’ 
last shared intent is not an effective method, because it proves to be erratic 
and unpredictable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction in 1980, courts have struggled to set forth a 
standard to determine a child’s habitual residence.  Lack of guidance from 
the Hague Convention itself has forced the federal circuit courts to shape 
their own standards, leading to erratic application of the Hague 
Convention and unpredictable outcomes in the respective proceedings.  
The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have constructed a standard that 
focuses on the child’s perspective while the Second and Ninth Circuits 
have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared 
intentions. 
In a Hague Convention proceeding, courts should conduct a hybrid 
subjective and objective reasonable person test focusing solely on the 
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child’s perspective, which looks to past experiences.  Any analysis to the 
contrary—specifically one that focuses parents’ shared intent—is flawed 
in numerous significant ways.  Hague Convention proceedings primarily 
arise when parents no longer agree on the child’s habitual residence, and 
often involve estranged parents.  To focus on the perspectives of people 
involved in this sort of dynamic is ineffective and disadvantageous.  
Moreover, it is unfitting to focus on the parents’ perspective when it is the 
child’s habitual residence that must be determined.  A uniform standard is 
imperative in order to properly fulfill the Hague Convention’s purposes. 
As such, courts should adopt a hybrid subjective and objective reasonable 
person standard that focuses on the child’s perspective and past 
experiences. 
 
